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Abstract— Formal methods have been applied to define 
requirements for safety and/or security critical software 
systems in some industrial sectors, but the challenge is the 
lack of a systematic way to take security issues into 
account in specifying the functional behaviors. In this 
paper, we propose a formal approach to expressing and 
explicitly interweaving security and functional 
requirements. With this approach, the functional 
behaviors of the system are precisely specified using the 
Structured Object Oriented Formal Language (SOFL), the 
security rules are systematically explored, and the result is 
properly incorporated into the functional specification as 
constraints. The resultant specification then defines the 
system functionality that implies the conformance to the 
security rules. Such a specification can be used as a firm 
foundation for implementation and testing of the 
implementation. We discuss the principle of interweaving 
security rules with functional specifications and present a 
case study to demonstrate the feasibility of our approach 
Keywords—SOFL, Security Requirements Engineering, 
Formal methods, Secure by design, Attack Tree Analysis 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Software systems are becoming ubiquitous with software 
applications being used in the fields of finance, education, and 
transport and logistics e.t.c. With this widespread use of 
software applications, the security of the data handled and 
stored by these applications has become more and more 
important. This has made software security to be one of the 
most crucial and necessary features of high integrity software 
systems. However, most software engineering methodologies 
have a bias of taking the standard approach of analysis, design 
and implementation of software system without considering 
security, and then add security as an afterthought [1].A review 
of recent research in software security reveal that such 
approach may lead to a number of security vulnerabilities that 
are usually identified after system implementation. Fixing such 
vulnerabilities calls for a “patching” approach since the cost 
associated with redevelopment of the system at such a point 
may be too high. However, the “patching” approach is an anti-
pattern in the development of high  risk software systems. To 
solve the challenge of integrating security attributes into 
software system requirements, we have developed a 
requirement engineering methodology that promotes a 
systematic integration of security requirements into the 
software design process. Our approach pushes for: 1.) Availing 
to the developer a variety of security methods and their 
tradeoffs. 2.) Providing a systemic methodology for integrating 
security requirements into the software design process. This 
methodology advocates for a security aware software 
development process that combines a selected standard 
software development methodology, formal methods 
techniques, and standard security functions[2].  
Our proposed methodology works by adopting the secure 
by design[3] software development approach through provision 
of a formal model for interweaving security and functional 
requirements. We achieve this by integrating process trees and 
attack trees[4] security analysis methodologies with a formal 
design process of functional requirement analysis and 
specification using Structured Object Oriented Formal 
Language (SOFL)[5] [6]. The process tree offers the benefit of 
a bounded scope, enabling the traversal of all the application`s 
processes from the root node to the forked child processes at 
the sub-nodes and end-nodes. While traversing through the 
nodes of the process tree, we conduct an attack tree analysis at 
each process node to identify potential vulnerabilities and 
define their mitigation strategies as additional security 
requirements.  
The main contributions of this paper are: 
 Provide a formal verifiable model for integrating 
security and functional software requirements. 
 Mitigate security threats [7] with proper security 
mechanisms by formally identifying, defining and 
expressing potential software vulnerabilities and 
their related countermeasure strategies. 
 The rest of the paper has the following organization. 
Section II focuses on related existing research on secure by 
design security requirement engineering approaches. Section III 
provides the basic concepts of our proposed methodology for 
interweaving functional and security requirements. To 
demonstrate the feasibility of our proposed approach, we 
present in section IV a case study through which we used the 
framework to generate, analyze and integrate security and 
functional requirements of an online banking application. 
Finally, section V concludes the paper by sharing our 
experience of the case study, lessons learnt and the future 
direction of our research. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
A number of researchers have worked on models targeting 
the integration of software security attributes at the 
requirements levels. Epstein et.al [8], proposed a framework for 
network enterprise utilizing UML notations [9] to describe 
Role Based Access Control model (RBAC). Shin et.al [10] 
offered a similar proposal focusing on the representation of 
access control such as MAC and RBAC using UML. Jurjens 
[11]  proposed an extension of UML, called UMLsec which 
focusses more on multi-level security of messages in UML 
sequence and state interaction diagrams. Similarly, Lodderstedt 
et.al [12] introduce a new meta-model components and 
authorization constraints expressed for Role Based Access 
Control. These attempts leveraged on extending UML to 
incorporate security concerns into the functionalities provided 
by the software system.  
Logic based approaches[14] have also been proposed for 
security aware requirement engineering techniques. They offer 
an expressive methodology for the specifications of security 
properties and security functions.  
 Mouratidis et.al [15] proposed the Secure Tropos 
methodology, which is based on the principle that security 
should be given focus from the early stages of software 
development process, and not retrofitted late in the design 
process or pursued in parallel but separately from functional 
requirements. However, to the best of our knowledge, the 
existing security requirement engineering approaches address 
different security concepts and take different viewpoints on 
matters security. Each modeling approach can express certain 
aspects but may lack conceptual modeling constructs to 
interweave security requirements with their associated 
functional requirements from the early stages of requirements 
engineering. 
 This paper seeks to contribute to this gap by presenting and 
discussing the application of a software engineering 
methodology, which supports the idea of secure by design 
approach by analyzing software vulnerabilities and 
incorporating recommended security considerations at the 
requirements engineering phase. 
III. OUR PROPOSED METHODOLOGY 
Our methodology for interweaving security requirements 
with functional requirements works by integrating functional 
requirements written in SOFL [6] and standard security 
requirements drawn from the Common Criteria for Information 
Technology Security Evaluation [16], the AICPA’s generally 
accepted privacy principles and the BITS Master Security 
Criteria [16]. We elicit these standard security requirements 
using SQUARE [17] methodology. SQUARE encompasses 
nine steps, which generate a final deliverable of categorized 
and prioritized security requirements. The outcome of the 
SQUARE methodology is a set of standard security 
requirements, broadly be classified into: Identification 
requirements, Authentication requirements, Authorization 
requirements, Security auditing requirements, Confidentiality 
requirements, Integrity requirements, Availability 
requirements, Non-repudiation requirements, Immunity 
requirements, Survivability requirements, System maintenance 
security requirements and Privacy requirements. Table I below 
showcases a sample identification requirement for preventing 
backdoors in authentication systems, elicited using SQUARE 
methodology. 
TABLE I.  SAMPLE STANDARD SECURITY REQUIREMENT 
Req ID: SR-IDEN-010 Category: Security 
Subcategory(ies)/Tags Identification, User ID, Login, 
Backdoor 
Name Backdoor Prevention 
Requirement All interfaces of software that are 
accessed for performing any action shall 
have the capacity to recognize the user 
ID 
Use Case(s) Initial login to the system, batch jobs, 
API calls, network interface 
Rationale Identification must be applied across all 
system interfaces. In the event that a 
“backdoor” exists through which access 
is granted with no identification, the 
security of the system would be 
compromised. 
Priority Critical/High/Medium/Low 
Constraints N/A 
Comments The term “interface” refers to the point 
of entry into a system. It can be a 
network interface, user interface, or 
other system interface, as appropriate 
Test Case Ref # STC-IDEN-010-1 
 
 Our key focus is to provide a framework that can 
holistically integrate functional and security requirements of a 
system software, and eventually yield software requirements 
that satisfy the required security requirements. The principle of 
integration is a basic conjunction between a functional 
requirement and its associated security requirement, expressed 
as follows. 
S’ = F ˄ S      (1) 
Where S’ is the defined software requirement, F the functional 
requirement and S the standard security requirement related to 
the functional requirement. Fig 1 below highlights a conceptual 
schema of our proposed framework. 
 Fig. 1. Proposed framework  conceptual schema  
A. The Proposed Framework in Details 
 Fig 2 below shows a conceptual meta-model of our 
proposed framework. It illustrates the process through 
which we intertwine standard security requirements with 
functional requirements specification written in SOFL 
formal language given by the following steps:  
 
Fig. 2. A meta-model framework for interweaving security and functional 
requirements specifications 
First, we generate the software’s functional requirement 
specification by expressing the requirements as a SOFL module 
alongside its associated Conditional Dataflow Diagram. Our 
key goal here is to define and formerly express all the 
functional behaviors as a complete set of functional 
requirements. After defining the functional requirements, we 
generate relevant standard security requirements based on 
client specifications and application`s operating environment. 
We achieve this by applying the SQUARE methodology. We 
then express the general standard security requirements as 
SOFL module invariants thereby achieving the first integration 
of security and functional requirements. 
The next step focusses on generating the application`s 
process tree. A process tree provides a hierarchical organization 
of parent processes and child processes spawned from the 
parent process. The generation of the process tree is achieved 
by converting the top level CDFD process of our SOFL module 
into a root process and the decomposed CDFD`s processes into 
child processes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. An Example of a parent and child process tree  
Next, we convert the parent and child processes into one or 
more System Functional Scenario forms. A System Functional 
Scenario form is a sequence of operations given by:  
di[OP1,OP2,…OPn]do                            (2) 
Where di is a set of input variables of the system behavior, do 
is the set of output variables and each OPi(i ∈{1,2,3,…n}) 
defines an operation. This System Functional Scenario defines 
a behavior that transforms the input data item di into the output 
data item do through a sequence of operations OP1,OP2,…OPn. 
contained in a parent process or a child process at any given 
node of the process tree. 
We then derive Operation Scenarios for the generated System 
Scenarios. We achieve this by transforming the pre- and 
postcondition of an operation into Operational Functional 
Scenario form consisting of operations such as 
(OPpre∧ C1∧ D1) ∨ (OPpre ∧ C2 ∧ D2) ∨… (OPpre∧ Cn ∧ Dn)   
Where Ci ( i=1, … n) is called a guard condition containing 
only input variables and Di ( i=1, … n) is known as defining 
condition containing at least one output variable. 
 Based on the derived Operational Functional Scenario, the 
final step focusses on eliciting potential vulnerabilities for each 
of the derived Operational Functional Scenario. We employ 
attack tree analysis [17] as a technique for identifying the 
potential vulnerabilities exhibited by each Operational 
Functional Scenario and further define a mitigation strategy for 
each of the identified potential vulnerabilities as part of the 
Operation Function Scenario guard condition Cn or  as an 
invariant of the SOFL module.  
 These mitigation strategies qualify as additional security 
requirements that are intertwined with their related functional 
requirements.  
B. Attack Tree Analysis 
We conduct attack tree analysis  through a goal oriented 
approach where we first identify a primary goal X 
representing a set of system assets or resources that may be 
targeted by an attacker i.e X = {X1, X2, …, Xn }. Our 
Parent process 
A 
B 
D E 
C 
F 
Root process 
Child process 
interest here is to have an attacker`s mindset by considering 
what can make a functional requirement of an application 
fail when attacked. We then divide the primary goal into 
sub-goals noting that either all or some of them are required 
to materialize the primary goal i.e S ⊆ X. We further select 
a permutation 𝜶 of S, and based on the sub tree and 
permutation 𝜶, we compute the expected outcome 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Attack tree analysis algorithm 
IV. CASE STUDY 
In this section, we demonstrate a case study from which we 
display a practical scenario of how our methodology achieves 
the interweaving functional and security requirements. 
We consider a typical online banking web application 
where a customer can perform several financial transactions. 
Figures 5 showcases a decomposed CDFD of the online 
banking application. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Decomposed CDFD of the online banking application 
From the decomposed CDFD we can generate a process 
tree like the one displayed below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Online banking Application Process Tree generated from decomposed 
CDFD 
For the sake of brevity and clarity, we shall only highlight 
how we interweaved a standard authentication requirement for 
the SignUp processes whose SOFL formal specifications can be 
expressed as shown below.  
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/* Online banking Formal Abstract Design Specifications */ 
 
module SYSTEM_ONLINEBANKING; 
 
/* const, var and type declarations  omitted for the sake of brevity */ 
inv 
 
forall[x: CurrentAccount ] | not exists [y: CurrentAccount ] | 
x.account_number = y.account_number; 
/* Each customer account is unique */ 
forall[ x: CustomerProfile ] | not exists [y: CustomerProfile ] | 
        x.email_address = y.email_address => x.national_id_num < > 
y.national_id_num 
/* Each customer has a unique email address and national ID number 
and each customer profile is unique */ 
 
process SignUp(customer_info: CustomerProfile) 
signup_complete:string 
                | error_message: string 
 
ext wr customer_details 
pre customer_info notin customer_details and  not 
exists[x:CustomerProfile] | x.email_address = 
get(customer_details).email_address and x.national_id_num =  
get(customer_details).national_id_num 
 
Comment 
 Each customer profile is unique and each customer profile has a unique 
email address and national identification number 
 
post if bound(signup_complete) 
      then customer_details = union(~customer_details, {customer_info}) 
       and signup_complete = “Signup Successful” 
      else error_message = "Either the provided email or National ID 
number already exists in customer records" 
 
end_process; 
 
 
Fig. 7. SOFL Formal Abstract Specification for the SignUp process of the 
online banking application 
The above SOFL specifications represent the functional 
behavior exhibited by our online banking application during a 
user sign up process. The process takes an object of customer 
profile information {full_name, username, password, 
national_id_num, email_address} and creates a new record of 
the customer if and only if the supplied customer information 
does not already exist in the external #customer_details 
database file where all the records of customer’s  profile are 
stored. Otherwise, it returns an error message indicating an 
existence of a similar record. For the login process, a user 
supplies a set of username and password, which are matched 
with those stored in the system’s database. 
A. Converting the SignUp into its equivalent System 
Functional Scenario Form  
Given a set of customer information {full_name, username, 
password, national_id_num, email_address} as inputs, a 
SignUp process and an error_message as output we can 
generate a System Functional Scenario Form; 
{full_name,username,password,national_id_num,email_addres
s} [SignUp, …]{error_message} 
 The next step involves deriving Operation Scenarios from 
our generated System Functional Scenario(s). 
B. Deriving Operational Scenarios 
To derive Operation Scenario(s), we take a Functional 
Scenario Process i.e SignUp and express it in the form of a 
chain of logical disjunction of a set of its individual 
conjunctive elements made up of a precondition, a guard 
condition containing only the input variables, and a defining 
condition containing at least one output variable i.e 
 
(∃x ∈  current_accounts | x not inset current_accounts ∧ 
(dom( x).full_name = full_name ∧ dom(x).username = 
username ∧ dom(x).password = password ∧  
dom(x).national_id_num = national_id_num ∧ 
dom(x).email_address = email_address) ∧  signup_complete 
= "Signup Successful") 
   OR 
(∃x ∈  current_accounts | x inset current_accounts ∧ (dom( 
x).full_name = full_name ∧ dom(x).username = username ∧ 
dom(x).password = password ∧  dom(x).national_id_num = 
national_id_num ∧ dom(x).email_address = email_address) 
∧  error_message = "Similar Records exist in the database 
already") 
 
  This formalized SignUp expression checks for the existence 
of similar user records before signing up a new user with the 
same set of record inputs. Otherwise, it returns an error 
message depicting the existence of a similar record with the 
provided set of inputs. 
 
C.  Eliciting potential vulnerabilities for each of the derived 
Operational Scenarios 
Eliciting potential vulnerabilities that may be associated 
with our derived Operational Scenarios, involves conducting 
an attack tree analysis on a behavior depicted by the SignUp 
process node in our process tree. To figure this out, we 
identify a goal or resource that is part of our derived 
Operational Scenario and may be a subject of an attack as well 
as consider a standard security requirement for the same.  
 A typical attack tree analysis on the SignUP process aimed at 
obtaining the stored username and password or identities of 
their equivalent yields 4 different paths i.e direct access to the 
database, brute force login, threatening the user or shoulder 
surfing. Whereas paths such as threatening the user or 
shoulder surfing can be mitigated through management 
controls, gaining direct access to database and brute force 
login may not be effectively mitigated through management 
controls. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8.  Attack tree analysis showcasing paths that can be manipulated to 
obtain customer’s personal information 
To eliminate brute force login attack path, we need to 
interweave an authentication requirements with the functional 
requirements responsible for user credentials creation and 
storage.  
Table 1 below describes a standard authentication requirement 
for credentials security [18] 
TABLE II.  CREDENTIAL SECURITY 
Req. ID: SR-OBA-001 Category: Security 
Subcategory(ies)/Tags 
Authentication, Credentials, Password, 
Hashing 
Name Credential Security 
Requirement 
The system shall store the information 
used for authentication in a secure manner, 
using public and widely accepted crypto 
algorithms 
Use Cases Password Storage 
Rationale 
Authenticating information must be stored 
in such a way so that a third party without 
authorization to do so cannot easily obtain 
it. For example, static passwords should 
Get user personal 
information 
Log in as target 
user 
Steal User 
Credentials 
Shoulder 
Surf 
Obtain 
User name 
Obtain User 
password 
Threaten 
User 
Obtain User 
password 
Obtain 
User name 
Brute 
force 
Login 
Gain direct access 
to database 
Exploit a “hole” 
in the application 
Obtain User 
password 
Obtain 
User name 
Req. ID: SR-OBA-001 Category: Security 
be passed through a one-hash function and 
only the hash should be stored. 
Priority Critical/High/Medium/Low 
Constraints N/A 
Comments 
Per-user salting is recommended for 
storing password hashing to provide 
additional level of security. 
Test Case Ref Number TC-OBA-001 
 
We achieve this by formally defining a secure way of 
storing the user password such as a one way hashing function 
given by f(r, h(P`)) which we express as part of the SignUP 
Operarion Scenario where, r = random number, h(P`) = 
Password hashing function, P` = Stored User Password 
Our strengthened Operation Scenario post-condition bearing 
functional and security requirements can therefore can be re-
written as follows: 
(∃x ∈  current_accounts | x not inset current_accounts ∧ 
(dom( x).full_name = full_name ∧ dom(x).username = 
username ∧ dom(x).password = password ∧  
dom(x).national_id_num = national_id_num ∧ 
dom(x).email_address = email_address) ∧  signup_complete 
= "Signup Successful") ∧  dom(x).password = f(r, 
h(~dom(x).password)) )) 
   OR 
(∃x ∈  current_accounts | x inset current_accounts ∧ (dom( 
x).full_name = full_name ∧ dom(x).username = username ∧ 
dom(x).password = password ∧  dom(x).national_id_num = 
national_id_num ∧ dom(x).email_address = email_address) 
∧  error_message = "Similar Records exist in the database 
already") 
V. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our experience with the proposed framework can be 
summarized as follows: The methodology require some 
software security expertise in addition to requirement 
engineering skills since it focusses towards achieving the 
integration the integration of security analysis into the software 
requirement engineering process. Moreover, knowledge and 
skills of applying SOFL specification language in writing 
software requirements is a prerequisite. Even though our 
proposed methodology cannot guarantee the development of a 
completely secure system, we are confident that the application 
of our methodology can assist in the development of a system 
that is more secure compared to a system whose SRE process 
were done in an ad hoc manner. 
 
This paper presents our experiences from the application of 
a methodology that interweaves functional and security 
requirements. We document our experience by applying the 
methodology in the development of an online banking 
application. Our findings indicate that the use of our approach 
supported the development of a software system that meets its 
security requirements and offers an early focus on security. 
Our experience on the other hand also indicated some issues 
for consideration, such as potential complexity of using formal 
notations in generating readable security requirements as well 
development of a supporting tool for the methodology. 
Resolving these issues is our main concern for future works. 
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